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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between bank structure, performance and competition in the South African banking industry.  
South Africa has a very concentrated banking industry with a C4 concentration ratio of over 80%.  The structure conduct 
performance hypothesis would suggest that competition in the sector would therefore be very low. We apply the Panzar-Rosse 
approach to bank level data for the period 1997 to 2014 to assess the competitive environment in the South African banking 
industry.  We estimate a revenue equation to obtain the H statistic. Changes in competition over the sample period are explored by 
estimating a time varying Panzar-Rosse H statistic.  This also allows us to assume a gradual change in bank competition rather than 
a static equilibrium.  We find that competition has increased over time. This result is consistent no matter how the time variable 
enters the revenue equation.    The estimated H statistic suggests that banks operate in a monopolistically competitive market 
structure.  Bank specific factors are generally consistent across alternative measures and in line with expectations. We also find 
that the increased concentration arising from the currency crisis in 2001/02 does not reduce the level of competition.  This result is 
somewhat puzzling because the industry exhibits relatively high transactions fees in the larger banks 
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1 Introduction 
Competition in the financial sector matters for several reasons.  Firstly, as in most other industries, a lack of 
competition can reduce efficiency, quality and innovation. Secondly and more specific to the financial sector, it can 
lead to under provision and other non-competitive behaviour such as the setting of high transaction fees. Moreover, 
the degree of competition can affect access to external finance for firms (Claessens & Laeven, 2005). This is 
particularly important in economies where certain segments of the economy such as Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) and households are primarily dependent on bank lending.  
The South African banking sector is highly concentrated with a C4ratio of over 80%. Theory would therefore suggest 
that the level of competition would be very low. Research has shown however that high concentration in the banking 
sector however does not necessarily imply a lack of competition. The contestable markets theory and the classic 
Bertrand equilibrium model under constant marginal costs for example will yield competitive pricing even with a 
concentrated market.  
The nature of concentration in the banking industry in South Africa has been the subject of concern for authorities. 
This concern has resulted in two key inquiries and follow-up reviews of these inquiries. The inquiries have found 
significant indicators of anticompetitive practices within the industry. What these inquiries have failed to do however, 
is to establish an unequivocal relationship between the level of concentration and competition in the market. Moreover, 
there is a scarcity of empirical studies on this relationship in the South African context. Known empirical studies 
include Okeahalam (2001), Mlambo & Ncube (2011) and Simbanegavi, Greenberg, & Gwatidzo (2014).  A number 
of cross country studies have also included South Africa in the estimations  (Claessens & Laeven, 2005, J.A. Bikker 
& Spierdijk, 2008, Jacob A. Bikker, Steenbeek, & Torracchi, 2012)  
This paper adds to this literature by exploring the relationship between bank structure, performance and concentration 
in South Africa. South Africa has been affected by key domestic and global events which would potentially affect the 
prevailing market structure in the banking sector and may bear significant implications on the level of competition in 
the country. These include the currency crisis of 2001/02, the enactment of the National Credit Regulation Act and 
the global financial crisis. Moreover, the products provided by the banking sector have changed over time. Electronic 
banking, credit cards and telephone banking have become mainstream banking products. In addition, the way these 
products are being provided has changed, even affecting the physical location of service provision owing mainly to 
innovations in technology. These changes can potentially affect bank competitiveness. To account for this, a time 
varying measure of competition is estimated. The paper also uses an extended data set relative to the Simbanegavi et 
al.(2014) study which also uses the Panzar-Rosse approach.  
2 Literature review 
The paper uses the Panzar-Rosse (Panzar & Rosse, 1987) approach to measure competition. Studies for industrialized 
countries include Shaffer (1982, 2002, 2004), Nathan & Neave (1989), Molyneux, Thornton, & Michael Llyod-
Williams (1996) J. A. Bikker & Groeneveld (2000), J.A. Bikker, Spierdijk, & Finnie (2007), J.A. Bikker & Spierdijk 
(2008; Jacob A. Bikker et al. (2012),  The results of these studies overwhelmingly support a monopolistically 
competitive market structure in the banking sector for industrialized countries. Molyneux et al. (1996) find oligopoly 
in the Japanese banking industry. 
 
Related studies for emerging economies have also been on the increase. Gelos & Roldós (2004) include a large number 
of emerging economies in their sample.  Others include Yeyati & Micco (2007) and Olivero, Li, & Jeon, 2011 . 
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Moreover, there is a relatively large number of studies on the MENA2 region and Asian countries. These include 
Mkrtchyan, (2005) on Armenia, Sufian (2011)for Malaysia,  Günalp & Çelik, (2006) for Turkey and Hamza & 
Kachtouli (2014) and (Jacob A. Bikker et al., 2012) (Abdelkader & Mansouri, 2013) for the MENA region. Their 
findings are in line with industrialised country evidence suggesting that the banking sector operates in a 
monopolistically competitive structure except for a few studies such as Al-Muharrami, Matthews, & Khabari (2006) 
and Al-Muharrami (2009) who find that Banks in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia operate under perfect competition markets 
conditions. Empirical evidence on sub-Saharan Africa has also been increasing in the last 10 years. However, most of 
such evidence is in the context of multi-country studies. In line with international evidence, African studies suggest a 
monopolistically competitive market structure in the banking industry.  
Table 1 summarizes the available empirical Panzar-Rosse studies for Sub-Saharan African countries. Although the 
results show evidence of monopolistic competition, a number of the studies indicate that there is significant market 
power in some African countries. For example, the level of competition in Botswana, Rwanda and the CEMAC 
countries is below 0.3. Banking sectors in these countries are also highly concentrated with the top 4 banks holding in 
excess of 80% of the market share. 
Known empirical Panzar-Rosse studies on competition in the South African banking industries include Mlambo & 
Ncube (2011) and  Simbanagevi et al (2014). Both studies find in favour of monopolistic competition. Claessens & 
Laeven (2005), Bikker et al (2012) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) also include South Africa in their multi-country 
studies and find that the banking sector in South Africa operates in a monopolistically competitive structure. Jacob A. 
Bikker et al. (2012) suggests that a scaled revenue equation as used in Claessens & Laeven (2005) tends to 
overestimate the level of competition. On that ground, the Claessens & Laeven (2005) estimate of 0.85 can be seen as 
to high. The current work is an extension of work done in the Mlambo & Ncube (2011) and  Simbanegavi et al. (2014) 
studies. One significant extension is that the current study recognises that competitive conditions may have changed. 
Accordingly, a time dependent H-statistic is estimated. The data set is also extended to 20143.   
  
 
 
2 Middle east and North Africa 
3 The previous studies  used a data set up to 2008 
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Table 1 Panzar-Rosse Studies on Sub -Saharan Africa 
Country Period covered H statistic Author 
Botswana 1990-2004 0.23 J.A. Bikker & Spierdijk, (2008)a 
CEMAC 1993-2004 0.27 Saab & Vacher (2007) 
EAC 2001-2008 0.61 Sanya & Gaertner (2012)  
Ghana 1998-2003 
1991-2004 
2001-2007 
0.56 
0.61 
0.66 
J.A. Bikker & Spierdijk (2008)a 
BUCHS & Mathisen (2005) 
 Biekpe (2011)* 
Kenya 1994-2001 
1989-2004 
2001-2008 
1998-2007 
0.58 
0.62 
0.60 
0.38 
Claessens & Laeven (2005) 
J.A. Bikker & Spierdijk (2008) a 
Sanya & Gaertner (2012) 
Mwega (2011)*  
Mauritius 1991-2004 0.58 Bikker and Spierdjk(2008) 
Nigeria 1994-2001 
1989-2004 
0.67 
0.74 
Claessens & Laeven (2005) 
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) a 
Rwanda 2001-2008 0.24 Sanya & Gaertner (2012) 
SSA-East 2003-2009 0.44 Fosu (2013)* 
         West 2003-2009 0.51 Fosu (2013)* 
        South 2003-2009 0.36 Fosu (2013)* 
         North 2003-2009 0.53 Fosu (2013)* 
South Africa 1998-2008 
1999-2008 
1994-2001 
1994-2004 
1987-2004 
0.69 
0.57 
0.85 
0.46 
0.54 
Simbanegavi et al. (2014)* 
Mlambo & Ncube (2011)* 
Claessens & Laeven (2005) 
Jacob A. Bikker et al. (2012)  
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008 a) 
Tanzania 2004-2008 
1989-2004 
2001-2008 
0.66 
0.74 
0.56 
Simpasa (2011)* 
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) a 
Sanya & Gaertner (2012) 
Uganda 1999-2002 
2002-2004 
2001-2008 
1995-1999 
2000-2005 
0.3 
0.49 
0.55 
0.23 
0.37 
Hauner & Peiris (2008)  
Hauner & Peiris (2008) 
Sanya & Gaertner (2012) 
Mugume (2010)* 
Mugume (2010)* 
WAEMU 2002-2007 -0.24-1.13 Leon (2012) 
Zambia 1990-2004 
1999-2008 
1998-2011 
0.53 
0.83 
0.45 
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) a 
Mwenda & Mutoti (2011) 
(Anthony Musonda Simpasa, 2013)* 
* Individual country studies, a explicitly estimates a time varying H-statistic 
3 The competitive environment in The South African banking industry 
At the time of writing, there is a total of 35 banks in the South African banking industry. Of these, 10 are locally 
controlled, 6 are foreign controlled, 14 are branches of foreign banks and 3 are mutual banks. There are also 38 
authorized foreign bank representatives who do not take deposits. Furthermore, there are 2 banks in liquidation. The 
sector experienced rapid entry of banks into the industry post-apartheid between 1994 and 1999. The majority of these 
new entrants were small to medium locally controlled banks. By 1999 however, these banks were experiencing 
liquidity pressures. A significant number of them exited the market or were absorbed by the existing larger banks. 
Between 1999 and 2003, about 22 banks exited the industry (Mboweni, T.T., 2004). Consequently, the sector 
experienced a significant amount consolidation and concentration going forward.  
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In addition to the entry of local banks, foreign banks that had exited the South African market due to the apartheid 
regime started to re-enter the market. By 2004, the share of foreign banks in total assets had risen to 9.4% from 3% in 
1994. In 2004 Barclays acquired controlling shares in ABSA. Figure 1 shows that by 2005, the consolidation process 
was almost complete and the market had settled to relative stability with very little entry and exit from both local and 
foreign controlled banks.  
 
Fig. 1. Number of banks 2002-2014 
Source: SARB annual reports(various years) 
Table 1 shows the concentration in the industry. The first column shows the CR4 ratio and the second, the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index. Equations 1(a) and 1(b) show how these figures are calculated. ௜ܵ  is the market share 
of the ith bank.  
ܥܴସ ൌ σ ௜ܵ௡௜ୀଵ    ………………………………………………………………………….(1a)  
 ܪܪܫ ൌ σ ௜ܵଶ௡௜ୀଵ ………………………………………………………………………….(1b) 
  
Fig. 2. Concentration in the South African bank industry 
Source: South African Reserve Bank supervision annual reports and financial stability reviews (various years) 
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The CR4 ratio shows the percentage share of market held by the largest 4 banks and is an easy way of visualising asset 
control in the market. The disadvantage of this measure is that it ignores the small banks.  The HH index builds on 
this by capturing features of the entire distribution of bank sizes. By squaring the shares, it gives more weight to the 
larger banks. The South African Reserve Bank interprets any value of the HHI between 0.1 and 0.18 as evidence of 
moderate concentration (SARB, 2011). The rapid entry of banks into the industry between 1994 and 1999 affected 
the concentration. It declined from 0.17 in 1995 to a low of 0.131 in 2001 after which it increased again reaching 
0.189 in 2009. 
These high levels of concentration raised concern amongst policymakers and in May 2003, a task group was 
established by the National Treasury to look into the competitiveness of the South African banking sector. A later 
commission was set up, dubbed the Enquiry into Banking Practices in South Africa to look into the implementation 
of some of the recommendations from the National Treasury report. The commission’s conclusion was that South 
Africa’s banks operate in an oligopolistic market where they avoid price competition. Banks however have argued 
that they compete vigorously (Competition Commision Banking Enquiry Panel, 2008). One of the practices prevalent 
in the sector is the complicated pricing structures which when combined with the network nature of banking services 
lock customers in to specific service providers. Consequently, the sector tends to maintain non-competitive pricing. 
The question of interest however is whether such uncompetitive practices arise from the concentration in the market. 
If this indeed the case, then competition policy which seeks to block any mergers in the sector would be justified. If 
not, any such attempts may lead to even higher fees for consumers.  
4 Methodology  
The study uses the Panzar-Rosse approach to estimate the relationship between concentration and competition. The 
analysis is based on a reduced form revenue equation derived from profit maximizing conditions (J.A. Bikker & 
Spierdijk, 2008; Jacob A. Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Panzar & Rosse, 1987).  Given bank profit as 
ߨ௜ ൌ ܴ௜ሺݕ௜ǡ ݊ǡ ܼ௜ሻ െ ܥ௜ሺݕ௜ǡ ݓ௜ ௜ܺሻ…………………………………………..………….(2) 
Where Ri  is the revenue for the ith  bank as a function of output,  y, the number of banks n, and revenue shift factors 
Z. Ci is the bank’s costs expressed as a function of output, input prices w and exogenous factors that shift the cost 
function, X. In equilibrium, marginal revenue (MR) is equal to the marginal cost (MC). 
ܯܴ௜ሺݕ௜ǡ ݊ǡ ܼ௜ሻ ൌ ܯܥ௜ሺݕ௜ǡ ݓ௜ ௜ܺሻ…………………………………………………………. (3) 
Therefore profit maximising output is given by  ݕכ ൌ ݕ௜כሺܼ௜ǡ ݓ௜ ௜ܺሻ where the * on a variable indicates equilibrium 
values. The revenue function therefore is   

ܴ௜כ ൌ ܴ௜כ൫ݕ௜כሺ݊כǡ ܼ௜ǡݓ௜ǡ ௜ܺ൯……………………………………………………………… (4) 
According to Panzar & Rosse (1987), a measure of competition is derived by differentiating  equation (4) with respect 
to input prices. The sum of the resulting elasticities provide a statistic H as reflected in equation (5), which measures 
the  extent to which changes in factor prices are reflected in equilibrium revenues.  
ܪ ൌ σ డோ೔డ௪೔
డ௪೔
డோ೔௜
…………………………………………………………………………….. (5) 
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H is therefore a statistic of market power and can thus be used to infer the level of competition in the industry. Both 
the sign and magnitude of H statistic is important. Table 2 summarizes the discriminatory power of different values 
of H. For a more detailed discussion see J.A. Bikker et al. (2007), Jacob A. Bikker & Haaf (2002), Vesala (1995) and  
Panzar & Rosse (1987).  
Table 2 discriminatory power of  H 
Values of H Competitive environment 
ܪ ൑ Ͳ Monopoly equilibrium: each bank operates 
independently  or perfect cartel 
Ͳ ൏ ܪ ൑ Ͳ Monopolistic competition. The higher the value of H 
the less the market power 
ܪ ൌ Ͳ Perfect competition 
When banks are operating under a monopoly, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs because the 
banks can pass the additional cost to their customers. This will reduce output and in turn revenues. The associated H 
value will therefore either be zero or negative. Where values of H are positive, banks are operating either under 
monopolistic competition or under perfect competition4. The magnitude of the H statistic is also important. Vesala 
(1995) shows that H is an increasing function of the elasticity of demand; the higher the value of H, the less the market 
power that banks have. Accordingly, a value of H which is not significantly different from unity implies a perfect 
competition.  
In empirical work, a log linear form of the revenue equation is estimated.  
݈ܴ݊௜ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ σ ߚ௜݈݊ݓ௜ଷ௜ୀଵ σ ߮௜݈ܼ݊௜ ൅௡௜ୀଵ σ ߮௜݈݊ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௡௜ୀଵ ………………………………… (6) 
The choice of the revenue variable depends on whether one assumes that the core business of banks is intermediation 
or that other sources of income are also important. In the first case, one would use interest income as the revenue 
variable while in the second case, a sum of interest and non-interest income is used.  Over the years, with innovations 
in the financial sector, noninterest income has become more and more important for banks. Accordingly, an increasing 
number of studies now incorporate both interest and non-interest income in measuring bank revenues. The primary 
revenue variable used in the study is total income. However, in order to compare the results with previous studies on 
South Africa, results based on interest income as the revenue variable are also reported.  
Following the literature, the cost of funds (lnWr) is measured by the ratio of interest expense to to total assets. The 
cost of labour (lnWl) is proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total number of employees. To proxy the cost of 
physical capital (lnWk), the ratio of non-interest expense to fixed assets is used. The shift factors used in the estimations 
capture bank specific behaviour which affects revenues. These relate to risk, sources of noninterest revenue, and the 
variations in loan portfolios (VLP). The risk variables used include the capital asset ratio (lnCAR) to account for 
capital adequacy and therefore the solvency risks borne by the depositors and ultimately the shareholders. The loan 
asset ratio (lnLAR) is used to proxy the amount of risk taken by a bank in its asset portfolio. To account for non-
 
 
4 The Panzar-Rosse model requires that general assumptions hold as outline in (Panzar and Rosse 1987 , Rosse and Panzar 1986)  
 
832   Munacinga Simatele /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  825 – 835 
 
interest income, the ratio of other income to interest income (lnNII) is used. Finally, the ratio customer of loans to 
total loans (lnLVP) is used to capture variations in the loan portfolio respectively.  
As intimated in section 2 above, South Africa has gone through significant changes over the last 20 years. To establish 
whether the competitive structure in the banking sector has changed over this period, the β coefficients in equation (7) 
are estimated as time dependent coefficients. A panel of 13 banks over a period of 16 years is used. The Panzar-Rosse 
statistic is estimated under the assumption of long-run equilibrium. In empirical work, long-run equilibrium is verified 
by regressing the rate of return on Assets on variables in equation (6). If the estimated H statistic is equal to zero, then 
the long-run equilibrium assumption is confirmed. An alternative approach is to assume that the market structures 
shifts gradually over time [Bikker and Groeneveld 1998, (J.A. Bikker & Spierdijk, 2008; Jacob A. Bikker & Haaf, 
2002). In this case, H can be estimated year-by-year. An alternative approach is to estimate the revenue equation 
recursively. Both of these approaches require a significant number of observations. A third approach which is used in 
this study is to estimate time-dependent coefficients. In this case, ܪ ൌ ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷሺߠݐ݅݉݁ሻ. In addition to 
estimating a time-dependent H coefficient, a dummy variable dum is used to capture the two key events that affected 
the financial sector within the sample period; the currency crisis of 2001 2002 and the global financial crisis.  
The estimation revenue equation therefore is  
݈ܴ݊௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ሺ ߚଵ݈݊ݓ௙௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ݓ௟௜௧ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ݓ௣௖௜௧ሻ݁ݔ݌ఏ௧௜௠௘ ൅ ߮ଵ݈݊ܥܣܴ௜௧ ൅ ߮ଶ݈݊ܮܣܴ ൅ ߮ଷܰܫܫ௜௧ ൅ ߮ସܸܮ ௜ܲ௧ ൅
ߠ݀ݑ݉௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧…………………………………………………….. (7) 
Equation (7) is applied to a sample of 13 banks. 11 of these banks are locally controlled while2 are foreign controlled. 
The excluded banks control less than 10% of the market based on the value of their assets. The coefficients on the 
prices of labour and physical capital are generally positive while that of the cost of funds is always negative. All the 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Of the three inputs, the cost of funds has the strongest impact on bank 
revenues. This is not surprising given that despite developments in noninterest income generating activities, the core 
business of banks remains intermediation and lending as the largest source of income. 
The discriminating test in table 2 can be used to establish the nature of market structures under which the banks in the 
South African banking industry operate. The null hypothesis that ܪ ൑ Ͳ and ܪ ൌ Ͳ are both rejected. Hence we rule 
out the possibility of either a cartel or perfect competition in the sector. The estimated H statistic suggests that the 
banks in the industry operate under monopolistic competition. Although banks possess some market power, a value 
of 0.71 suggests a relatively high degree of competition within the industry. Moreover, the time coefficient is also 
significant and positive. The value of θ gives an indication of whether the competitive structure has been changing 
over time or not. If ߠ ൌ Ͳ, then equation (7) reduces to the time invariant H statistic. If ߠ ൐ Ͳ, then there is an increase 
in competitiveness over time. Conversely,  ߠ ൏ Ͳ implies a reduction in competitiveness. The results for that model 
are reported in table 35. The estimated ߠ is significant and positive suggesting that the level of competition within the 
banking industry in South Africa has been increasing over time. It is however small in magnitude.  
Table 3 Estimation results 
 
 
5 Various nonlinear specifications of the time variable are used for robustness check. The results show positive but very small values of ߠ . The 
small values of ߠin the cubic and quadratic expressions may suggest that developments in the South African banking sector are relatively linear in 
nature. 
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Variable Dependent variable: total income Dependent variable: interest 
income 
Funding rate 0.578 0.001 0.30 0.068 
Wage rate 0.382 0.001 0.298 0.012 
Capital Price -0.249 0.006 -0.167 0.037 
Time 3.75-e07 0.032 4.35-e07 0.015 
Capital asset ratio -0.807 0.00 -1.41 0.00 
Loan asset ratio -0.014 0.00 0.629 0.001 
Non-interest income 0.18 0.928 -0.21 0.001 
variations in loan portfolio 1.335 0.01 1.81 0.001 
dum -0.647 0.001 -0.456 0.026 
     
H-statistic 0,711  0.431  
R2 0.51  0.85  
The ratio of noninterest income to total revenue is significant and negative. This can be explained by the increased 
complexity of financial markets (J.A. Bikker & Spierdijk, 2008). This complexity is revealed in the opacity of the 
South African banking sector. Banks are reluctant to compete on price and as a result try to over differentiate their 
products leading to lock-in effect and an increase in banks’ market power [competition commission inquiry into 
banking 2008]. The ratio of customer loans to total loans has a positive effect on revenues as expected. Of the shift 
variables, it has the largest effect on revenues. 
With reference to other African countries, competition in the South African banking industry seems to be higher except 
for Tanzania and Zambia. However, the comparison needs to be seen in context in that the most recent results for 
comparison as shown in table 1 are those from J.A. Bikker & Spierdijk (2008) and Fosu (2013)  which use data only 
up to 2008 and 2009 respectively. Given the dynamics in the global financial sector and the increased integration of 
financial markets of African countries, it is likely that the levels of competition in these countries has changed over 
time.  
5 Summary and conclusion 
The paper examines the relationship between bank structure and competition in the South African banking industry. 
The industry experienced a substantial amount of consolidation between 1999 and 2005. To establish whether this had 
an effect on the market structure within which the banks operate, a time dependent Panzar-Rosse H statistic is 
estimated. In line with the literature, the results indicate that banks in South Africa operate in monopolistically 
competitive markets. The magnitude for the estimated H statistic indicates a relatively low level of market power. 
Another key result of this paper is that the estimates show that competition has been increasing over time despite the 
significant consolidation. This result should be a comfort to policymakers who have made concerted efforts to both 
investigate the levels of competition and ensure that competition grows within the industry. The problem however is 
that the industry still suffers from significantly high transaction fees and effects of lock-in effects on customers. Non-
price competition in the market leads to over differentiation of products and increases complexities of banking 
services. Given the results in this paper, research is required to establish the causes of these apparent structural 
constraints within the industry. 
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